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Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech –
The United States, Australia and Singapore
compared
Keith Thompson
University of Notre Dame, Australia
keith.thompson@nd.edu.au

Freedom of Religion (more correctly, freedom of
conscience, belief and religion under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1966 (ICCPR)), and Freedom of Speech have been
logically tied together since human beings were
sentient creatures. The two rights are inseparably
connected by logic, since one cannot speak freely
unless one has the freedom of conscience to think
out something to say. For this reason, the two rights
were combined in the First Amendment to the US
Constitution in 1789 and that joinder has cemented
the connection ever since even though the
extrapolation of the two rights has seen them
separated in modern human rights instruments. That
latter-day separation in the interests of more
complete expression however, seems to have
disconnected the two rights in the minds of modern
philosophers, legislators and judges.
I will begin this paper in Part I, by setting out the
logical connection between the two rights as simply
as I can before briefly discussing the philosophical
separation of the two in US jurisprudence and in the
political philosophy of John Rawls since 1991. In
that discussion, I will suggest that it is John Rawls’
notion of ‘public reason’ which has powered the rise
of ‘political correctness’ (PC) at the expense of both
freedom of speech and religion, despite Rawls’
denials of inconsistency. I will then explain how the
imposition of public reason onto the human rights
expressed in the US Constitution by the US Supreme
Court is inconsistent with the doctrine of
parliamentary
sovereignty
in
Westminster
democracies including Australia and Singapore
before outlining the current debate in Australia
concerning both freedom of speech and freedom of
religion.
In Part II, I shall move to Australia. While s
18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975
(Cth) is the pivot around which the current
Australian debate swirls, I will seek to position that
argument in a broader long term discussion of
human rights. While contemporary arguments about
racism, immigration and same sex marriage may
seem intellectually discrete and separate, they are

unwillingly joined together at the intersection
between freedom of conscience and speech. My
purpose in identifying that connection, is to enable
the consideration of how human rights are best
balanced when they compete despite the PC
demands of a particular moment. It is this last
discussion that I hope will engage Singaporean
attendees at the conference. For Singapore’s long
term practical need to balance freedom of speech
and religion in the interests of national security
provides a context that moderates the discussion of
human rights in a vacuum.
In Part III I therefore explain how freedom of
conscience and speech have been balanced in past
US and Australian jurisprudence, and I measure that
against the international standards that are now set
out in the ICCPR. That discussion also enables
comparison with the Singaporean jurisprudence and
ultimately concludes there is not a great deal of
difference in practice – the jurisprudence of all three
countries falls short of the ICCPR standard though
there was a thirty year period between 1960 and
1990 when the US came close. The unnecessarily
narrow approach to the free exercise of religion in
Australia is identified as a primary reason why s 116
has been described as a dead letter in commentary. I
suggest that all three governments need to explore
ways to upgrade their protection of freedom of
conscience and speech so that it accords with the
standards set in the ICCPR.
I conclude that because the protection afforded to
freedom of conscience and speech in the US,
Australia and Singapore falls below the
international law standard set by the ICCPR, all
three countries have work to do to enhance human
freedom. As a teacher of Australian constitutional
law, it is simple for this author to observe that
Australia could achieve this goal by passing
domestic legislation using its federal external affairs
power. Singapore could begin by ratifying the
ICCPR and then taking steps to implement it in
domestic law. The US ratified the ICCPR in 1992
with reservations and could pass domestic law to
implement it except that the Supreme Court does not
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currently agree that the Constitution can be
interpreted consistent with the ICCPR. There is the
possibility that the Supreme Court’s view may
change if the new President has the opportunity to
appoint judges who see the Free Exercise Clause
differently than their post 1990 predecessors.
Part I – Freedom of Conscience and Freedom of
Speech are inseparably connected
My first observation is that the freedoms recognized
in international human rights instruments since the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in
1948 do not stand alone. They are a ‘compound in
one’. They stand or fall together. Though it is trite, a
single matchstick can be easily broken, but a
collection of matchsticks is harder to break. Freedom
of Conscience, Speech and Association stand
together or they fall. The stronger they are, the
stronger the individual rights and freedoms of the
citizens of the country concerned. That these rights
are compound rights, is demonstrated by their logical
connection. Freedom of conscience logically
precedes freedom of speech because one cannot
speak freely unless one can first think freely. But
equally, freedom of conscience is meaningless unless
the things an individual thinks about can be freely
expressed. While some human laws have been
designed to regulate human thought (as with tests for
public office), human conscience is generally
unregulated as international human rights norms
mandate. But international human rights norms also
say that the expression that flows from freedom of
conscience (the forum externum) should only be
regulated to the extent it interferes with public safety,
health or morals. 1

speech are logically antecedent to freedom of
association. That is, freedom of association is
meaningless unless someone can think and speak
freely so as to communicate in association with
others. Again, freedom of conscience, speech and
association are a compound. To the extent one is
diluted, so are all the others.
When this compound or indivisible nature of the
human rights and freedoms that theorists have
traditionally named as the first freedoms is
misunderstood, 2 3 we pass laws abridging one or
other of these freedoms without counting the
combined cost, and freedom as a whole
suffers a slow “death by a thousand cuts”. 4
This understanding of freedom as a compound of
sub-freedoms - conscience including religion, plus
speech and association - was elementary for the
American framers. It is a part of the reason why they
lumped freedom of religion and speech together in
their First Amendment. John Rawls, the famous late
20th century American political philosopher,
accepted that these freedoms were foundational in
US jurisprudence when he published A Theory of
Justice in 1971. 5 But something had changed in his
understanding when he wrote Political Liberalism
in 19935 and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”
in 1999. 6 In A Theory of Justice in 1971, he wrote
that because people in his ‘original position’ “do not
know ... what their religious or moral convictions
are ... [t]he question they are to decide is which
principle they should adopt to regulate the liberties
of citizens in regard to their fundamental religious,
moral and philosophical interests.” 7 He concluded
quite simply that
equal liberty of conscience is the only principle
that the persons in the original position can
acknowledge. They cannot take their chances

Just as freedom of conscience is antecedent to
freedom of speech, so freedom of conscience and
1 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(1950) does not anticipate any limitations on the forum
internum in Article 9(1). Article 9(2) says the forum
externum shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966) follows the European
Convention and states that freedom to manifest one’s
religion should be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others.
2 Martha Nussbaum has said that democracies need to be
vigilant in teaching their citizenry the interrelationship of
fundamental human rights lest they be unwittingly
whittled away (Liberty of Conscience, Basic Books, New
York (2008), 359-

3

). In that connection she has recalled Thomas
Jefferson’s statement
The Tree of Liberty must be refreshed from
time to time by the blood of patriots and martyrs. It is its
natural manure (Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens
Smith, Paris, 13 November 1787). Human rights are a
comparatively recent human discovery and have come
as the legacy of thousands of years of bloodshed.
4 International Finance Trust Company v New South
Wales Crime Commission (2009) 261 ALR 220 per
Heydon J 238 [57].
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard
University Press, 1971. 5 John Rawls, Political
Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993.
6 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ in
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University
Press, 1999.
7 Rawls, above n 4, 181.
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with their liberty by permitting the dominant
religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to
suppress others if it wishes. 8

For Rawls in 1971, equal liberty of conscience was
not absolute. As in the ICCPR, it “is limited...by the
common interest in public order and security” 9 since
from the original position, each would recognize
“that the disruption of [public order and security] is
a danger for the liberty of all”. 10 But in Political
Liberalism in 1993, Rawls’ position on equal liberty
of conscience had shifted. In my 2015 article in The
University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review, 11
I explained Rawls’
‘idea of public reason’ this way:
In a nearly just society there is a public
acceptance of the same principles of justice”. 12
But there does not need to be complete
agreement. There can even be “considerable
differences in citizen's conceptions of justice
provided that these conceptions all lead to
similar political judgments”. 13 “[D]ifferent
premises can yield the same conclusion” 14 and
therefore groups with different perspectives can
accept the same judgment in a dispute though
for different reasons. However, “there comes a
point beyond which the requisite agreement in
judgment breaks down and society splits...on
fundamental questions”. 15 Responsible citizens
will not then do as they please. While they may
act conscientiously and disobey law, yet they
will be held responsible for what they do. 16
Citizens responding to such differences should
sacrifice their comprehensive doctrines in the
interests of preserving the overlapping
consensus necessary to preserve society when
viewed from the original position. To use
Rawls' own words:
Citizens realize that they cannot reach
agreement or even approach mutual
understanding on the basis of their
irreconcilable
comprehensive
doctrines. In view of this, they need
to consider what kinds of reasons they
may reasonably give one another
when fundamental political questions
are at stake. I propose that in Public
Reason comprehensive doctrines of
truth or right be replaced by an idea of
the politically reasonable addressed
8

Ibid.
Ibid 186.
10 Ibid 187.
11 “Should ‘public reason’ developed under US
establishment clause jurisprudence apply to Australia?”,
(2015) 17 UNDALR, Article 6, 107-134
< http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/undalr/vol17/iss1/6/ >.
12 Rawls, above n4, 340.
13 Ibid.
9

to citizens as citizens. 17

By the late 1990s, equal liberty of conscience in
Rawls’ thought was not compromised by the
sacrifice of one’s comprehensive beliefs if they lay
outside political consensus because everyone was
making the same sacrifice and that sacrifice was part
of a citizen’s “duty of civility”. 18
In my 2015 Notre Dame article, I explained that
Rawls did not believe he was sacrificing any part of
equal liberty of conscience when he asserted the
need for his idea of public reason to trump it in the
interests of overlapping consensus in liberal
democracies. But I suggest that a life spent
marinating in US Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and particularly the compromises of
the free exercise of religion which were embedded
in the 1991 decision in Employment Division v
Smith, 19 blinded him as to how his idea of public
reason undermined liberty of conscience as
understood in international human rights
instruments. Rawls’ belief that religious ideas
should not be used in the public square unless they
could be explained in proper political terms,
misunderstood the idea of freedom of religion prized
by the US framers and expressed more fully in the
ICCPR. In the First Amendment and in the ICCPR,
religious believers could speak about anything they
chose in the public square unless, in the ICCPR’s
modern expression, those words would endanger
“public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others”.
Outside of the US, the idea that religion and the state
must be completely insulated from one another in
the interests of freedom of conscience and religion
is foreign. Europe is full of countries with
established state churches where freedom of religion
is accepted and protected. In Australia where there
can be no national church, 20 21 the federal
government does not offend ‘the establishment
clause’ by spending 35% of its educational budget
in the support of private schools many of which are
sponsored by churches.21 Nor can the High Court of
Australia strike down legislation on constitutional
grounds because it offends human rights because
there is no constitutional Bill of Rights in Australia.
14

Ibid.
Ibid.
16 Ibid 341.
17 Rawls, above n6, 131-32.
18 Ibid 135-136, 138.
19 Employment Division v Smith 494 US 872 (1990).
20 Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth
(‘DOGS case’) (1981) 146 CLR
21 .
15
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Additionally in Australia, under the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, the Parliament can
abolish any common law right it wishes to abolish,
so long as it does so in sufficiently clear and
unambiguous words.22 But the absence of
constitutional protection for human rights in
Australia does not mean that those rights do not
exist. Political accountability to the public is not
something that just happens three yearly at the ballot
box; it is vigorous and is part of the reason why
Australia has had four different Prime Ministers
between 2012 and 2016. However, to date the
Australian federal government has not seen fit to
pass
domestic
human
rights
legislation
implementing the commitments it made when it
ratified the ICCPR in 198023 and which it has the
constitutional power to pass.24
In Singapore, freedom of religion is protected by the
Constitution but it is interpreted narrowly.25

21

Ibid.
See for example Electrolux Home Products Pty
Ltd v Australian Workers’s Union (2004) 221 CLR
309 per Gleeson CJ and K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor
Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501 per French CJ.
23 Article 2 of the ICCPR sets out the commitments made
by ratifying states. Australia’s agreement to be bound
by Article 2 was made subject to her constitutional
processes and the agreement of the Australian states and
territories. The full text of the reservation is set out at <
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1980
/23.html>.
24 See for example Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen
(1982) 153 CLR 168, Victoria v Commonwealth
(Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416 and
Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1.
25 Article 15 provides:
(1) Every person has the right to profess and
practice his religion and to propagate it.
(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any
tax the proceeds of which are specifically
allocated in whole or in part for the
purposes of a religion other than his own.
(3) Every religious group has the right –
22

22 The state of the law in these two Westminster
democracies stand in contrast to the position in the United
States where even the results of public referenda have
been struck down on that basis. See Perry v
Schwarzenegger Case No. C 09-2292 VRW
(US District Court for the Northern District of
California, 4 August 2010) where District Court Chief
Justice Vaughan Walker struck down a constitutional
ballot proposition (Proposition 8) which had amended
the California State Constitution because it had no
rational basis even though it was the will of the majority
of the voters in that state.

(a) to manage its own religious affairs;

However, the fact that Rawlsian public reason has
not led, and should not lead to the invalidation of
laws in Australia because a trace of religious
influence can be detected in their text, 22 does not
mean that Rawlsian ideology is without influence in
Australia. As I noted in my article in the UNDA Law
Review cited above, journalists and other opinion
leaders regularly repeat Rawls’ idea that religious
expression and belief has no place in the public
square and that it should not justify government law
or policy. 23 And the Rawlsian idea that speech
should be voluntarily managed in the interests of
overlapping consensus in the public square, is
increasingly evident in new anti-discrimination laws
despite ICCPR freedom of speech, free exercise of
religion under s 116 of the Constitution and the
freedom of political communication recognized by
the High Court as an implied right under the
Australian Constitution since 1992. 24 25 There are
many examples of
(b) to establish and maintain institutions
for religious or charitable purposes;
and
(c) to acquire and own property and hold
and administer it in accordance with
law.
(4) This Article does not authorize any act
contrary to any general law relating to
public order, public health or morality. See
below nn 41-45 and supporting text for
discussion of the narrow interpretation of
this Article in Singapore.

challenges to freedom of conscience and expression
in Australia that could be discussed to show the
reach of the Rawlsian ideology popularly known as
PC,29 but for the sake of brevity, I shall only canvass
the current debate concerning s 18C of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). I have chosen that
debate as my focus in Part II, not because it most
clearly focuses the conscience and religious aspects
of the friction, but because it is a federal law and so
applies in every state.

23 Above n11, nn 3-7. Well known Australia media
personality Andrew Denton has reaffirmed this
proposition recently with his insistence that the churches
should step aside from the public debate concerning
euthanasia law reform (The Australian, August 10, 2016).
24 The High Court of Australia first recognized an implied
freedom of political communication arising under ss 7
and 24 of the Constitution in two cases in
25 - Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1
and
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth
(1992) 177 CLR 106. That implied right has been
developed since including in Lange v
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Part II – Should we limit speech that is merely
offensive?

religious speech, must be created as formal law or
they do not meet the ICCPR standard.

In the international context, the expression of
religious belief can only be limited if the limitation
is prescribed by law and it is “necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 26 Of
course religious expression is not the only speech
that may be limited. But speech generally, is subject
to an equivalent limitation under Article 19(3) of the
ICCPR. 2728 To accord with these ICCPR

In western democracies like the United States,
Australia and Singapore, the requirement that
formal law be passed before freedom of expression
including freedom of religious expression can be
limited, ought to be elementary. But compliance
with the second limb of the ICCPR limitation
requirement, is anything but elementary. For if the
word ‘necessary’ is interpreted subjectively to mean
that a law can be passed because the legislature
believes, hopes, or wants to decide as a matter of
policy that such a law is necessary, the protection
intended is denuded of practical effect. The
limitations expressed in Articles 18(3) and 19(3) of
the ICCPR rely on a strongly objective
interpretation to achieve their protective purpose.
This strongly objective interpretation of the
necessity requirement in the ICCPR is controversial
in Westminster democracies that accept the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty rather than
the older American developed idea that courts can
strike down any law that does not accord with
fundamental principles including

Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR
520, Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 and most
recently in McCloy v NSW [2015] HCA 34. 29 9 For
example, the proposed ‘prosecution’ of Catholic
Archbishop Julian Porteous under Tasmanian antidiscrimination laws despite constitutional protection of
freedom of religion in that state because he distributed a
booklet to Catholics concerning traditional marriage that
offended transgender Greens political activist, Martine
Delaney; the settled ‘prosecution’ of two pastors who had
offended Muslims attending their seminars about Islam
(Catch the Fires Ministry Inc v Islamic Council of Victoria
[2006] VSCA 284); and the successful appeal by a gay
outreach group seeking to prevent youth suicide when they
were denied the use of a Convention Centre run by the
Brethren Church (Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors
v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited & Ors
[2014] VSCA 75 (16 April 2014).

specifications, limitations on freedom of speech,
including religious speech, passed by the
legislatures of countries which have ratified the
ICCPR and are genuinely striving to accord with
these now well established principles of
international law, must be passed in valid national
or state law and they must be “necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 302
The requirement in the ICCPR that limitations on
freedom of speech including religious speech, be
created by valid national or state law, denies
‘ICCPR legitimacy’ to arbitrary or capricious
exercises of discretion by law enforcement officers
or other public officials which do not carry the
stamp of formal legislative authority. The point is
that any limitations on freedom of speech including
26

ICCPR Article 18(3).
The full text of Article 19 setting out the right to
freedom of expression under the ICCPR reads:
28 . Everyone shall have the right to hold
opinions without interference.
29 . Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice.
27

(a)
For respect of the rights or reputations
of others;
(b)
For the protection of national security
or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
Article 20(1) prohibits war propaganda and Article 20(2)
requires the prohibition by law of expression that would
incite discrimination, hostility or violence on the
grounds of race. 32 ICCPR, Article 18(3).

those set out in constitutional instruments and
supra-national human rights covenants. 31
This strongly objective interpretation of the
necessity requirement, is also controversial in
Europe where the European Court of Human Rights
accords the legislatures of member states a ‘margin
of appreciation’ in setting laws for their own
countries since the Court is said not to know what is
necessary in the member states. 32 Still, the European
30 . The exercise of the rights provided for in
paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
31 Martin Krygier, “The Rule of Law: Pasts,
Presents, and Two Possible Futures”, Annual Review of
Law and Social Science, 12 (2016) 199, 207.
32 See for example Handyside v United Kingdom
5493/72; (1976) 1 EHRR 737; [1976] ECHR 5. 35 For
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Court of Human Rights does make some decisions
against member states despite protestations of
necessity and reference to the margin of
appreciation doctrine, if the Court considers that
such laws could not have been passed by any
reasonable legislature.35 The point flowing from this
brief discussion of a vexed topic, is that sovereign
legislatures do not always pass objectively
reasonable laws especially when they are confronted
with crises like the war on terror. 33 The point is good
for all countries regardless of the extent of their rule
of law compliance tradition. Respect for the rule of
law and objectively adjudged human rights, is only
as good as the last law that a legislature has passed.
Human fallibility and caprice is not a uniquely
individual human trait. It can be manifested by
groups of human individuals including legislatures.
So how should the ICCPR limitations on freedom of
expression including religious expression be
interpreted in practice? I submit that a strongly
objective interpretation of the ICCPR limitation
principles was intended, remains appropriate and is
essential if human rights are to survive. The post
WWII context of the UDHR and the ICCPR
demonstrates the intention that strongly objective
interpretation was intended. That is because the
UDHR and the follow on covenants are widely
accepted as flowing from the excesses of the Axis
regimes and particularly the Nazi regime during that
World War. Anything less than strong objectivity
would thus subvert the intention of those who
framed the UDHR and the ICCPR. Thus I further
submit that objective interpretation of those
covenants is an integral part of their whole meaning.
It is now appropriate to situate the current debate
about whether s 18C of the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 (Cth) in Australia, is consistent with the
level of freedom of speech established in
international law by Articles 18 and 19 of the
ICCPR. While a full bench of the Federal Court of
Australia in Toben v Jones in 2003 34 affirmed that s
18C was a valid law under the Australian
Constitution, they did not address the ICCPR
question, and even if they had done, any
observations they made would have been obiter
dicta and not binding since the Australian Federal
example Kokkinakis v Greece 14307/88; [1991] 17
EHRR 397; [1993] ECHR 20.
33 See for example Krygier, above n33, 208.
34 Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1. 38 I observe that
there are compelling arguments that this interpretation is
inconsistent with the implied freedom of political
communication developed in High Court jurisprudence
since 1992 (see for example Forrester J, Finlay L and
Zimmerman A, No Offence Intended: Why 18C is
wrong, Connor Court Publishing, 2016). While

Government has not made the ICCPR part of
Australian domestic law despite their promises to do
so. The reason s 18C was valid under the Australian
Constitution was because the full Federal Court
considered it was consistent with the provisions of
the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (the Race
Convention) which Australia had sought to
implement in domestic law.38 My following
suggestion is that if Australia were to keep its
commitment to similarly implement the provisions
of the ICCPR in domestic law and to interpret those
provisions in the strong objective manner I have
outlined above, then s 18C would be invalid from
the date of that implementing legislation.
Why would s 18C be inconsistent with the ICCPR if
the ICCPR were implemented in domestic law?
Because it cannot be said that a law which outlaws
speech that merely offends on grounds of race is
necessary to implement the provisions of the Race
Convention in a manner that is consistent with
Freedom of Speech under the ICCPR. I suggest that
although the full Federal Court found that s 18C was
reasonably adapted to the purpose of implementing
the Race Convention as the only applicable
international instrument then binding in Australian
domestic law, 35 that finding would not be available
if the ICCPR was also a part of Australian domestic
law and was interpreted objectively. That is because
the balance that the ICCPR requires be struck in
favour of freedom of speech before it can be limited,
is a manifestly higher standard that the full Federal
Court observed in respect of the implied freedom of
political communication under the Australian
Constitution. That is not to say that the full Federal
Court correctly interpreted the nature of the implied
freedom of political communication under the
Australian Constitution,40 but a different balance
would have to be struck if the ICCPR had a place in
Australian domestic law as the federal government
has promised.
So what has this got to do with Singapore? Like
Australia and the US, Singapore is subject to
international law whether it accepts it as binding and
follows its imprimatur in domestic law or not. To the
extent that Singaporean freedom of religion and
fascinating, that debate is beyond the scope of the
current paper that is focused on international law with
regard to freedom of speech including freedom of
religious speech.
35
Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1, 35 [144] per Allsop
J. Note that Carr J found that it [wa]s for the legislature to
choose the means by which it carrie[d] into or g[a]ve
effect to a treaty” (ibid 10 [20] citing the Industrial
Relations Act Case (1986), 487) and
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speech jurisprudence is inconsistent with the
ICCPR, it should be reformed as an example to other
Asian nations and in the interests of consistent
international freedom. However, because Singapore
has a completely different religious and security
climate than Australia, the balancing would not be
the same. To interpret freedom of speech under the
Singaporean Constitution in a manner consistent
with the ICCPR, the Singaporean courts would have
to determine whether any limitations on freedom of
speech including religious speech, had been validly
passed as laws by the legislature including whether
they were objectively “necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.”41 Yong CJ’s
rejection of the submission in Chan Hiang Leng
Colin v PP in 199442 that there had to be a ‘clear and
present danger’43 to public order before freedom of
religion could be restricted, is not consistent with the
ICCPR. His honour preferred Malaysian precedents
to find instead that “religious beliefs and practices
which tend to run counter to [the security of the
country]

Kiefel J simply concurred with Carr J on the constitutional
issues arising.
40 See the discussion at n38 above.
41 ICCPR Article 18(3).
42 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] SGHC 207; [1994]
3 SLR (R) 209. 43 Chan Hiang Leng Colin’s counsel
cited a
Malaysian case (Tan Boon Liat v Menteri Hal
Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1976] 2 MLJ 83 (High
Court)) as his authority for this interpretation of the
limitation in the Singaporean Constitution.

had to be restrained.” 36 He did not accept that any
balancing of individual freedom of religion was
required although it is arguable that he chose scales
which set the balance in favour of state interests
rather than the
individual as the ICCPR requires. 37
However, Yong CJ’s narrow interpretation of
Article 15 of the Singaporean Constitution is
consistent with what the Australian High Court has
said about s 116 of the Australian Constitution. It is
also arguably consistent with what the US Courts
36 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR (R) 209,
235 [64].
37 Ibid 233, [58-59]. No evidence was called
suggesting Chan Hiang Leng Colin’s expression
posed any direct threat to national security. 46
Reynolds v US 98 US (8 Otto) 145 (1878).
38 For example, see Sherbert v Werner 374 US 398
(1963) where the Supreme Court overturned a State law
which denied unemployment benefits denied to a Seventh
Day Adventist woman who would not work on Saturdays,
and Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205 (1972) where the

have been saying about the free exercise of religion
under the First Amendment since the decision in
Employment Division v Smith in 1991. In Part III I
shall therefore discuss that overall consistency
against my suggestion that the ICCPR requires a
broader objective approach and the more general
jurisprudential idea that human rights guarantees
should be interpreted generously so that minority
interests are not sacrificed on the altar of inchoate
majoritarian security demands.
Part III – Balancing in a manner consistent with
the rule of law
The first time the US Supreme Court adjudicated the
meaning of the Free Exercise clause in their First
Amendment was in Reynolds v US in 1879.46 In that
case, the Court held that while the polygamist being
prosecuted was entitled to freedom of belief and
opinion under the clause, the First Amendment did
not prevent the federal government from passing
laws that criminalized his religious practice. That
narrow view was varied beginning with the Warren
Court in the 1960s until 1990. During that period,
the Supreme Court held that the State could not
interfere with religious practice unless it had a
compelling reason to do so and there was no less
intrusive way to achieve its otherwise legitimate
goals. 38 But in its decision in Employment Division
v Smith in 1990, 39 the Court returned most of the
way to the Reynolds decision in 1879 when it found
once again that a neutral law of general applicability
did not offend the Free Exercise clause. Religious
speech gets more space than religious manifestation
in the US since US jurisprudence arguably protects
freedom of speech more than any other country in
the world. However, even freedom of speech is
under threat from the logic that was used by US
federal District Court Judge Vaughan Walker in his
decision in the Schwartzenegger
decision referred to above in Part I.49
In Australia, there was no ‘Warren court’ period
where the High Court was generous towards the free
exercise of religion. Indeed, there have only been
two cases where the free exercise of religion clause

Supreme Court held that the State’s interest in educating
Amish children was outweighed by their parents’
religious wish to continue their education after the 8th
grade outside the state school system.
39 Employment Division v Smith 494 US 872 (1990)
where the State of Oregon was allowed to deny
unemployment benefits to an employee dismissed for
smoking peyote in Native American Church services
because the law was not targeted at that religious
observance. 49 See above n26 and related text.
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was considered closely by the Court, 40 and in one, it
was interpreted so narrowly that a conscientious
objector still had to do his military service. Some
commentators have described the High Court’s
treatment of the conscientious objector’s argument
as dismissive.51 Certainly 70 years later in the
Church of the New Faith case,52 the High Court’s
treatment seemed more respectful towards freedom
of religion since religion itself was given a broad
ecumenical definition. In that case, the Church of
Scientology was as entitled to the same exemption
from Victorian state payroll taxes as any other
church that believed in a supreme being or principle
and adhered to a code of conduct as part of its
religious practice. But the breadth of the Court’s
definition of religion did not signal a marked change
since the concession that some civil liberty flowed
from s 116 in the Stolen Generations case was as
crowded with qualifications as ever. 41 In the Stolen
Generations case, the High Court held that the
Northern Territory laws in question did not offend s
116 because they had not been passed with the
intention of prohibiting the free exercise of religion
and, in any event there had not been sufficient
evidence at the trial to prove such interference
anyway.
To summarise – despite the pretense that the US and
Australia respect the rule of law where the free
exercise of religion is concerned, the evidence
suggests otherwise if Article 18 of the ICCPR is
accepted as the gold standard. Though two
Australian High Court judges have confirmed that
grants of human liberty are to be interpreted
generously 42 so that the free exercise clause in s 116
of the Australian Constitution could have been read
consistently with Article 18 and without implied
limitations, to date the High Court has always found
implied limits on the free exercise of religion even
though those limits do not appear in the text of the
Constitution.

applicability did not offend their Free Exercise
clause in Employment Division v
Smith in 1990. That means that Chief Justice Yong’s
decision in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP in 1994
was consistent with the enduring jurisprudence of
freedom of religion in Australia and in the US. It
also means that all three sets of jurisprudence are
inconsistent with the standard of freedom of religion
set out in Article 18 of the ICCPR.
In the words of Chief Justice Yong, the discord
concerns how religious manifestation and
expression can be legitimately restrained. His
finding again was that “religious beliefs and
practices which tend to run counter to [the security
of the country] had to be restrained.”55 The US
Supreme Court has found that the government may
restrain religious practice by any neutral law that did
not single out the religious practice in question for
attention.
Paraphrasing the language of Justice Rich of the
Australian High Court in 1943, the Australian
position remains that religious practice can be
lawfully restrained to prevent the “cloak[ing
of]…subversive opinions or practices and
operations dangerous to the common weal”. 43 In
contrast, Article 18 of the ICCPR says that the
freedom to manifest religion including in speech,
may only be limited by law when that law is
objectively “necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others.”57 The difference is the
ICCPR’s necessity requirement. Even if one argues
that ‘necessity’ does not need to be interpreted
objectively, it has to mean more than that the
government just has to be reasonable when it
interferes with religious freedom.

Arguably, the US Supreme Court settled in a similar
place when they found that a neutral law of general

In Singapore beliefs and practices may be restrained
by law whether that restraint is necessary or not.
Though the Appellant’s ‘clear and present danger to
national security’ submission in Chan Hiang Leng
Colin v PP may have suggested a bar higher than the

40 In Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366 the High
Court denied that an adherent of the Jehovah’s Witness
faith was denied free exercise of religion by being
compelled to undergo compulsory military training; and
in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v
Commonwealth (Jehovah’s
Witnesses Case) (1943) 67 CLR 116, the High Court
denied that regulations passed to disestablish the
Jehovah’s Witness church in South Australia interfered
with the free exercise of religion though the regulations
were struck down on other grounds. 51 Blackshield and
Williams (Australian
Constitutional Law & Theory, Federation Press, 2014,
1174) say that Griffith CJ and Barton J “impatiently

dismissed the suggestion that s 116 was infringed” in the
appeal in Krygger (above n50) and that their “grudging
approach in Krygger was reinforced in the Adelaide
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses case in 1943 (ibid). 52
Church of The New Faith v Commissioner of PayRoll
Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120.
41 Kruger v Commonwealth (Stolen Generations Case)
(1997) 190 CLR 1.
42 Barwick CJ and Murphy J in DOGS case (1981) 146
CLR 559 (per Barwick CJ at 577, and per Murphy J at
622 and 632-634). 55 Above n44.
43 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v
Commonwealth (Jehovah’s Witnesses Case) (1943) 67
CLR 116, 149-150. 57 Article 18(3).
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necessity standard in the ICCPR, the Court’s finding
that religious practice or expression which runs
counter to an undefined requirement of national
security, falls below the international standard and
undermines freedom generally. The same
conclusion follows an analysis of the US and
Australian jurisprudence. In the US, the idea that a
neutral law that is generally applicable trumps any
manifestation of religious liberty, neuters the
international standard on two counts. First, it does
not limit state intrusion into religious practice or
expression to matters of “public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others”; and secondly, it does not
impose the necessity requirement under Article
18(3) of the ICCPR. The only legislation that is
forbidden to the state in the US under the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise clause in
Employment Division v Smith is legislation that
directly targets religious practice. It is difficult to
accept that the US framers would have considered
that finding protected the church from the state at all
as seems to have been the original intent.
In Australia, Rich J’s statement that “opinions or
practices subversive of the common weal” may be
legitimately restrained, may be worse because it is
so pregnant with subjectivity and because it
anticipates the regulation of mere opinion which is
non-derogable under all of the international human
rights instruments.
The additional subjectivity problem in Rich J’s
formulation is that it denies the existence of a fixed
religious freedom standard in Australian
constitutional law. The purpose of the ICCPR’s
necessity limitation standard on the other hand, is to
insist that freedom of conscience, belief and religion
are foundational and may not be challenged on the
basis that they are “subversive of the common weal”
without formal proof. Rich J’s analysis and the
apparent unwillingness of the High Court to accept
that s 116 at least implied a fixed religious freedom
standard, is a part of the reason why Keith Mason
has suggested that the section has become “a dead
letter” 44 reflecting the views of Murphy J in the
DOGS case, 45 though for different reasons.
Conclusion
And so I conclude that the protection intended for
the free exercise of religion by international law
does not yet exist in the United States, Australia or
44 Keith Mason, Constancy and Change: Moral and
Religious Values in the Australian Legal System,
Federation Press, 1990, 118.
45 DOGS case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 631 [38]. 60 City of
Boerne v Flores 521 US 507 (1997) where the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act 1993 was passed to reinstate
the compelling interest test which was struck down by

Singapore. While all three countries provide a
measure of protection for the free exercise of
religion under their constitutions, in each case that
protection allows the governments to abrogate that
freedom any time they choose to do so. All of these
countries theoretically have the legislative power to
pass laws that provide the protection intended for
the free exercise of religion under the ICCPR. In the
US, the reason for the decision not to pass such
legislation would appear to be that it seems futile
after the Supreme Court struck down the last attempt
to create such protection in City of Boerne v Flores
even though Congress had unanimously passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993.60 The
recent election of Republican President Donald
Trump with the power to restore a conservative
majority to the Supreme Court, may encourage
better legislative protection of free exercise of
religion in the future.
In Australia, better protection of religious freedom
is a matter of political willpower. Despite
recommendations from the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in 1998
that such legislation is necessary, 46 members of the
Commonwealth Parliament always fear that such
legislation will see them lose their seats at the next
election. At present, that is because religious
freedom legislation would protect the unpopular
Muslim minority and might also protect Christian
interests above those of the gay and lesbian lobby
that seeks the legalization of same sex marriage.
In Singapore, the government does not want to
increase free exercise protection because it does not
want to protect religious extremists who potentially
threaten the nation’s security.
All three countries have practical reasons not to
improve the protection of religious freedom in a
manner that accords with the ICCPR standards even
though they have the power to pass laws that accord
with the ICCPR, but they lack the faith to do so. If
these three western nations cannot manifest faith in
ICCPR standards and international law in general,
there seems little hope for other countries where the
dictates of personal liberty make human rights
protection more essential.

the Supreme Court in Employment Division v Smith in
1990, was itself struck down.
46 Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief, Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Australia,
1998.
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